Disparate Impact: History and Consequences by Gray, C. Boyden
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 54 | Number 6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Symposium
July 1994
Disparate Impact: History and Consequences
C. Boyden Gray
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
C. Boyden Gray, Disparate Impact: History and Consequences, 54 La. L. Rev. (1994)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol54/iss6/4
Disparate Impact: History and Consequences
C. Boyden Gray*
1. INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 had a highly unusual passage through the
legislative process. It generated a presidential veto at the beginning and an
extraordinary amendment at the end, yet denied what happened as a legal matter
by designating just two paragraphs in the Congressional Record as the sole
legislative history.' With the dust settled and the legislation out of the daily
news, now is a good time to assess what the bill actually did on the quota
issue-which, along with damages, were the two provisions in the bill which
generated the most controversy.
Who won the fight, the civil rights interest groups or the Bush administration
lawyers? This was the "who's up, who's down" way the struggle was framed
by contemporaneous press accounts, which all but totally ignored the fundamen-
tal educational policy dispute at the heart of the struggle. Interestingly, the
activists of both left and right (as represented on this issue by William Coleman
on behalf of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Inc., on the one hand, and Patrick
Buchanan on the other) claimed that the Bush administration caved in to the
interest groups.
As I will try to demonstrate, the Bush administration not only advanced
public policy toward the goals the administration sought from the beginning, but
did so far more convincingly than even its most ardent supporters claimed at the
time. Indeed, it actually achieved a result that was better (at least on the quota
issue) than would have been the case had there been no bill at all.
A. Background
Explaining this necessarily requires a brief review of a complicated area of
employment law called disparate impact theory, and its effect on the links
between education and the workplace.
The law of disparate impact stems from Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,2 one
of the two most important Supreme Court cases of the last twenty-five years
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(Roe v. Wade3 being the other). In Griggs, the Court held that if an employer
uses a hiring qualification, such as a requirement for a high school diploma, that
operates to exclude blacks disproportionately to whites (because blacks have a
higher drop-out rate), then the employer can continue to use the requirement only
if he can justify its use as a matter of "business necessity."4
There are three basic components to a case premised on disparate impact.
The first component relates to what the plaintiff must prove in order to force a
business necessity explanation by the defendant; this issue involves how much
of a causal relationship the plaintiff must prove between the questioned hiring
requirement and the numerical imbalance.
The second issue relates to the burden of proof with respect to the business
necessity explanation once an exclusionary practice or requirement has been
adequately identified. The question is whether the plaintiff retains the ultimate
burden of disproving the adequacy of the employer's justification for using a
particular requirement, or ,whether the employer has shifted onto himself the
burden of proving the justification's adequacy.
The third issue relates to the definition of business necessity. How much
justification must be proven, or disproven, in connection with the questioned
hiring requirement? For example, can an employer simply assert that a high
school education is a good thing to have as a condition of employment, as the
military does today in recruiting, or must he prove that high school graduates
perform better in each job than drop-outs? If so, what kind of proof is
necessary?
B. Wards Cove
As would be expected, these issues were subject to numerous refinements
by the Supreme Court in the two decades that followed Griggs. Then, in 1989,
the Supreme Court decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio., That decision
was characterized by civil rights activists as overruling Griggs, and that
characterization in turn prompted the activists' civil rights bill, which was
described both as overruling Wards Cove and "restoring" Griggs. Supreme
Court decisions with broad policy implications are not, however, easily and
cleanly overruled or restored. In fact, the civil rights bill as initially proposed
and vetoed would have done more than just overrule one case and restore
another. Nevertheless, an understanding of these two cases as they relate to the
three issues identified above is necessary to an understanding of the bill that
emerged at the end.
Let us begin with the burden of proof, since it is the easiest to explain.
Although Griggs itself did not deal explicitly with the burden of proof, lower
3. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
4. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431, 91 S. Ct. at 853.
5. 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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court decisions had generally placed the burden on the defendant. Thus, Wards
Cove's placement of the burden on the plaintiff represented a significant
decision, if not an overruling of Griggs. Since the-Bush administration early on
agreed to shift the burden to the defendant, however, this component fell out as
an issue in the legislative fight.
Wards Cove's impact on the other two issues was less clear. Griggs
assumed, without spelling out, the need for a causal link between a showing of
numerical imbalance and a specific hiring requirement. In Wards Cove, the
dissent thought the majority had tightened somewhat the showing of causation
required.6 But the dissent did not explain clearly what it thought the correct
causative requirement should be, nor did it claim that any court decision, let
alone Griggs, had been overruled or changed by the majority. This issue
nevertheless became one of the two major battlegrounds in the legislative war,
and will be explored in more detail below.
The third issue, the definition of business necessity, was neither briefed by
the parties nor spelled out with clarity by the Court in either Griggs or Wards
Cove. The dissent in Ward's Cove argued the majority opinion had relaxed the
definition, yet the dissent did not explain exactly how the majority had done so.'
Such a disagreement would hardly seem grounds for a two-year legislative
slugfest, yet, as will be shown, the initial bill asked for far greater change in the
law than the Wards Cove dissent.
Wards Cove, then, did not overrule Griggs in the obvious sense of
abandoning disparate impact theory. At most, it refined Griggs and Griggs'
progeny at the margins. The truth is that Wards Cove was thus seized as an
occasion for revising and expanding, as opposed to restoring, disparate impact
law in a comprehensive fashion. Accordingly, in the discussion that follows, I
will deal with the legislative fight as just such an attempted revision and
expansion, and not an effort to restore disparate impact theory, Griggs per se, or
any other particular case that followed it.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE
Since, as noted above, the administration early on agreed that the burden of
proof was properly shifted to the defendant in a disparate impact case, the
legislative struggle focused on the two remaining issues: business necessity and
causation.
A. Business Necessity
The best place to start in describing the bill is with the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources report's explanation for including a business
6. Id. at 671-72, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id., 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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necessity definition in the legislation.8 It is important to remember, however,
that the explanation is relevant only to the motives and purposes underlying the
bill, not to the meaning of the language ultimately adopted. The bill signed by
President Bush used language very different from the bill described in the report,
and also contained language precluding resort to the committee report for
determining the legislative history. 9
1. The Goal: Codify Mhe Uniform Guidelines
The report states simply and clearly that the business necessity definition
was intended to legislate the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection
Procedures,"0 which the report says exemplify the prevailing pre-Wards Cove
law regarding the meaning and method of proving business necessity. The
Uniform Guidelines were written by the federal civil rights bureaucracy after
Griggs, and purport to tell employers how that bureaucracy would determine
whether employer selection practices passed Title VII muster. The guidelines,
the report says, "embody the legal principles that were accepted and applied prior
to Wards Cove, and which the Committee intends [the bill] to restore.""
But nothing in any pre-Wards Cove case codifies the Uniform Guidelines,
and, conversely, nothing in Wards Cove expresses disapproval of the Uniform
Guidelines. The dissenters in Wards Cove pointed out only that the majority
opinion contains dicta saying that an employer could keep using a challenged
hiring practice only on a showing that it is important, beneficial, or relevant to
its business, not that it is "essential" or "indispensable" for its business.' 2 But
indispensability is not the touchstone of the Uniform Guidelines, and does not
appear as an issue in the committee report, which does not refer to the
indispensability dispute between the two Wards Cove opinions as the reason for
codifying the Uniform Guidelines.
Rather than focus on indispensability, the report cites the Uniform
Guidelines as important because they require statistical, rather than anecdotal,
demonstration or validation that a hiring practice produces better job performance
for an entry level job than some less exclusionary practice (or nothing at all).
The focus, the report says, is on seeking the lowest possible hurdle: "The fact
that the best of [the] employees ... score well on a test does not necessarily
mean that ... some particular cutoff score on the test, is a permissible measure
of the minimal qualifications of new workers entering lower level jobs."'3 The
8. S. Rep. No. 315. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 41-45 (1990) [hereinafter Committee Report].
9. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1993) [hereinafter Uniform Guidelines].
11. Committee Report, supra note 8. at 42.
12. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642. 671-72. 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2132 (1989)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Committee Reports, supra note 8, at 43 (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 434, 95 S. Ct. 2362. 2379-80 (1975)).
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critical issue in, for instance, a case involving a strength test for firefighters is
"what degree of strength is actually required for effective job performance"; in
other words, the report says proof of business necessity must address "the
particular cutoff score used on a test."4 To give another example, if an
employer cannot provide statistically valid studies demonstrating that "A"
students actually make fewer defective widgets than "C" students, then an
employer cannot make any hiring decisions based on grades.
The fact is the Uniform Guidelines, because they made it so difficult for
employers to defend so many neutral practices that had a disparate impact,
created enormous pressure on employers to avoid "bad numbers" by adopting
surreptitious quotas.
2. Reasons for the Goal
Why did the legislation's proponents focus so intensely on the Uniform
Guidelines generally, and on statistical correlation between hiring practices and
actual job performance specifically, when Wards Cove did not deal with these
issues?
First, civil rights advocates might have been justified in feeling that there was,
for them, a disquieting trend or pattern developing in Supreme Court jurisprudence.
While Wards Cove alone might not seem adequatejustification for alarm, it was not
decided in a vacuum. In addition to the Supreme Court cases overruled in whole
or in part by the civil rights bill, there was one major contemporaneous ruling that
was never targeted by the civil rights groups: the Richmond set-aside case, City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'s There is no mention of this case in the Senate
committee report, and thus no public explanation of why the proposed legislation
did not target it. One possible explanation is that the decision involved a
constitutional ruling, making congressional alteration more difficult. 6  But
another explanation is that the case clearly involved quotas, and that the civil rights
community knew that the public would never accept an explicit quota bill.
There were private indications that a desire to codify a quota regime was the
principal motivation behind the legislation. William Coleman, the bill's principal
author, was quite candid with me about what he wanted. "What I need is a
generation of proportional hiring, and then we can relax these provisions," he told
me in my office. David Gergen confirmed to me, before the 1992 election, that
Coleman had confided to him as well that quotas were the goal, but that he had
never reported that fact because he felt he had to respect the confidentiality of his
source. Of course, the legislative struggle could have been quite different if Gergen
or others had published Coleman's objectives.
14. Committee Report. supra note 8, at 44.
15. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
16. Those who objected to Croso,,, however, would undoubtedly argue that Congress had power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit that decision.
1994] 1491
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A second, and consistent, explanation lies in the rapid changes enveloping
the work force, work-force training, and education. Big corporations, which
followed the Uniform Guidelines because their government contracts exposed
them to the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11,246,"7 were
no longer the principal sources of new jobs. To the contrary, they were
downsizing and becoming increasingly edgy about competition from small
business, which in the 1980s accounted for more than seventy percent of all job
creation. Attaching the Uniform Guidelines to their rivals would not only put a
drag on their efficiency, it would ultimately give big corporations an edge, since
they were better able than their smaller competitors to absorb the costs of
compliance with the guidelines, including the costs of education and training that
the guidelines did not permit companies to require at the outset as a condition
of employment.
At the same time, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
was increasingly redirecting its enforcement resources away from disparate
impact cases to cases involving intentional discrimination. This change, in turn,
was posing a threat to the Uniform Guidelines. The EEOC does not have
rulemaking authority under Title VII, and thus the guidelines were not rules, and
had potency only as enforcement guidelines. If the EEOC was no longer
pressing disparate impact cases, the guidelines had no independent force or
effect. And this meant they would no longer be pushing companies to adopt
quotas, to the chagrin of the civil rights groups.
It was thus in the interest of both the civil rights community and some big
business to see the Uniform Guidelines codified as substantive rules of law and
then applied to small companies. For this purpose, a major public, congressional
push was essential.
Finally, there were major educational reform efforts mounting that might
permit employers and parents to insist on more accountability from the public
school system. Albert Shanker wrote persuasively of the need to allow
employers to help educational accountability by rewarding school achievement
in hiring, something the civil rights laws essentially prohibited." Professor
Bishop of Cornell University conducted a comprehensive study of this problem
and concluded that the civil rights laws were a major impediment to school
reform. 9 Emerging growth companies, which lacked the deep pocket resources
to do their own training, were looking increasingly to high schools as the source
for better trained employees.20
Indeed, this was even true for some large companies. The Wall Street
Journal recently reported, for example, that Chrysler had to spend one million
hours training workers shifted from an old plant to operate a highly automated
17. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965). reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
18. Making Schools Count. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1991, at E7.
19. See Hearing on H.R. I Before the House EdLIc. Labor Comm., 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991)
(testimony of John H. Bishop).
20. See infa text accompanying notes 58-63.
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new plant using self-directed work teams.2" The Journal noted the training
costs were high in part because the workers had not completed high school.
While the results were good, the Journal reported the head of Chrysler's
manufacturing operations as saying, "if that's the way I'm going to handle my
training, I'm going to go out of business. 22 As a result, Chrysler has dramati-
cally raised its hiring standards."
As for the school choice movement, the ability of parents to choose between
schools assumes there is some standard of quality or achievement against which
to measure different schools. But that requires, at a minimum, that parents
themselves be able to make the same kinds of distinctions that colleges make
when they signal that some secondary schools provide better preparation than
others, something the civil rights laws all but prohibited.
The downgrading of a high school education's importance arguably began
with Griggs itself, which prohibited the use of a diploma requirement for certain
jobs. But the demands of global competition for a more educated work force
had, twenty years after Griggs, raised the stakes on the importance of education
to productivity. As the New York Tines summarized the recent G-7 jobs summit
in Detroit, "Government officials from the United States and other leading
industrial nations agreed today that the only way to create more good jobs in the
face of rapid technological change was to upgrade education, particularly for
those who are the least skilled."2' 4
3. The Real Issue: Education
Indeed, it was this argument over education that constituted the core dispute
between the Bush administration and the legislation's supporters (who
tried-with great success-to stifle debate about quotas by denying that the bill
involved them). One of the bill's principal sponsors dismissed President Bush's
concerns about the bill's impact on education by characterizing the President's
position as demanding diplomas from would-be fifty-year-old janitors. But the
future of American's job creation does not center on the fifty-year-old janitor
who is a high school dropout. Rather, it centers on finding ways to strengthen
the educational system for today's children so that they will have more than a
janitor's opportunity.
The Uniform Guidelines did not purport explicitly to prohibit use of
educational achievement outright in making hiring decisions, but they did require
employers who wished to do so to provide studies proving that "A" students
perform particular entry-level jobs better than "D" students. As Professor Bishop
21. Neal Templin, Auto Plants, Hiring Again, Are Demanding Higher-Skilled Labor, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 11, 1994. at A I. A4.
22. Id.
23. Id. at A].
24. Thomas L. Friedman, Accent on Education as Talks on Jobs End, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1994,
at Cl.
14931994]
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has demonstrated, this is prohibitively expensive to do, especially in a rapidly
evolving work force where job descriptions are changing on a day-to-day basis
to meet the demands of innovation, competition, and new markets. One question
that apparently has no answer is whether the military, which is exempt from Title
VII and thus empowered to demand a diploma (which ninety-nine percent of its
recruits have), can prove statistically that high school graduates make demonstra-
bly better soldiers than dropouts do. The performance of the military in the
Persian Gulf War would seem to make obvious the benefits of a diploma
requirement, but that performance would not constitute adequate validation under
the guidelines.
The sensitivity of the Uniform Guidelines' role in divorcing educational
achievement from the hiring process was underscored by a mini-firestorm that
was ignited by an EEOC leak to the New York Times towards the end of the
legislative fight. "Bush administration officials say they are considering new
regulations that would allow employers more latitude in the use of aptitude tests
and educational requirements in hiring, promotion and pay," the story began.
23
It went on to describe a White House meeting that included EEOC Chairman
Evan Kemp, Labor Secretary Lynn Martin, and myself, and that resolved to
revise the Uniform Guidelines. The proposed changes would, the story said,
send a message that doing well in school was important in getting a job and
would "also provide support for Mr. Bush's idea for giving voluntary academic
tests to students in the 4th, 8th and 12th grades," because under current rules
"any employer who used test results in making personnel decisions and. did not
show that they were directly related to job performance could face a discrimina-
tion lawsuit.
26
The reaction was, according to the story, quick and strong. "It's off the
wall," said the research director of Women Employed, a Chicago advocacy
organization.21 "As social policy, it would be a major change," said an
anonymous Washington civil rights lawyer.28 "I do not think they have the
legal power to do that," said Richard T. Seymour, director of the Employment
Discrimination Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights.2 9 "They
would have to have statutory language to do that, and I don't think Congress
would allow it." 30
The article said that the language change under consideration would permit
employers "to use ability tests, provided that such tests were 'not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion or national
25. Steven A. Holmes. White House Weighs Change in Job Discrinination Rules. N.Y. Times.
May 31. 1991. at B6.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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origin."' 3 Although the article did not point it out, the proposed language was
already the law of the land; it was virtually word for word the same as Section
703(h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.32 The civil rights activists had thus
turned that act upside down by regulation, a process allowed if not encouraged
by the judiciary, and were now insisting that Congress would have to reenact the
1964 Civil Rights Act in order to revive it. (It could, of course, be argued that
disparate impact theory also turned upside down the anti-quota provisions of the
1964 Act, Section 703(j) of which prohibits any requirement that an employer
"grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the
race . . . of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may
exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race...
employed by any employer ... in comparison with the total number or
percentage of persons of such race ... in the available work force in any
community . . . .33) Now, with the Supreme Court apparently. having second
thoughts, and the Bush administration threatening to go back to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the legislation's proponents might well have thought it imperative to
expand and freeze the regulatory regime in legislation before further changes
gathered momentum.
Did they succeed in requiring statistical proof of a link between education
or other hiring requirements and actual job performance? Proponents realized
that overruling Wards Cove to indicate what the law was not would do nothing
to indicate what the law (i.e., the Uniform Guidelines) should be, especially since
Wards Cove itself had not mentioned the Uniform Guidelines, let alone rejected
them. So the proponents created a new definition ("essential to effective
performance of the job") that they said was intended to codify the Uniform
Guidelines and its requirement for proof of a link between educational
achievement and job performance.
4. The ADA Compromise
Notwithstanding Coleman's and Jordan's later assertions to the contrary,
however, this language never survived in either the text of the statute or the
exclusive legislative history referenced in the statute. The language used in the
last-minute compromise that permitted President Bush to endorse the bill was
taken instead from the Americans With Disabilities Act, which no one has ever
associated with proportional hiring goals. The ADA says simply that the
employer must "demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity." Business necessity
is not separately defined as it was in the initial bill, and the legislative history
says only that "the terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are intended to
31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1988).
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reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio."'
What does this statutory language mean? It clearly does not require a
linkage between a hiring practice and job performance. As Michael Carvin, a
former official in the Reagan Civil Rights Division, has stated, "a selection
device need not be related to job perfornance as such.""5 There are, he said,
many employment characteristics, such as interpersonal relationships, absentee
rate, drug use, and ability to teach, "that are related to a job, even if they are not
directly relevant to job performance."' This question was the centerpiece of
the debate, with "job performance [being] the essential constraint that the
Kennedy forces wanted to place on the employer's hiring and promotion
decisions."" Accordingly, he wrote, the term does not encompass validation
and the other "statistical studies [that] are incredibly difficult to develop" and
that are required by the Uniform Guidelines, because "none of that is incorporat-
ed, codified, or referenced in the 1991 Act or its legislative history."38
Coleman and Jordan took virtually the opposite position in an op-ed piece
in the Washington Post shortly after the bill was signed by President Bush.39
"Job selection criteria must be related solely to job performance," they wrote.4°
Furthermore, they said there must be "a substantial relationship" between
selection criteria and job performance. 4 Finally, they wrote, the ADA, from
which the civil rights bill compromise language was taken, and EEOC's final
interpretive regulations issued earlier that July, "make clear that there must be
a close relationship between selection criteria and actual job performance. '42
The Coleman-Jordan emphasis on job performance is puzzling, since there
is nothing in the ADA or the EEOC's regulations that remotely suggests the use
of the words "job performance." The language of the statute is, quite simply,
"job related." The EEOC regulations are more revealing, but not in the direction
suggested by Coleman and Jordan. The EEOC regulations interpreting this
language state:
It is important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not
intended to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard
to production standards, whether qualitative or quantitative .... If an
34. 137 Cong. Rec. S15,276 (daily ed. Oct. 25. 1991) (citations omitted).
35. See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1153, 1159 (1993) (emphasis in original).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1159-60.
38. Id. at 1160.
39. William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan. Jr.. How the Civil Rights Bill Was Really
Passed. Wash. Post, Nov. 18. 1991. at A21.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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employer requires its typists to be able to accurately type 75 words per
minute, it will not be called upon to explain why.., a typing speed of
65 words per minute, would not be adequate. Similarly, if a hotel
requires its service workers to thoroughly clean 16 rooms per day, it
will not have to explain why it requires thorough cleaning, or why it
chose a 16 room rather than a 10 room requirement.
43
The EEOC interpretation thus clearly repudiates the committee report's
command, relevant to the vetoed bill, that "proof of business necessity must
address the particular cutoff score," and that in a strength requirement for
firefighters, the employer prove "what degree of strength is actually required for
effective job performance."" In other words, because "it is not the intent of
this part to second guess an employer's business judgment with regard to
production standards," such standards will "generally not be subject to a
challenge under this provision."4
This required deference to an employer's business judgment is, of course,
flatly inconsistent with the Uniform Guidelines and their focus on actual job
performance. What, if anything, did the EEOC interpretive ADA rules say about
the guidelines? The rules state that the guidelines "do not apply to the
Rehabilitation Act and are similarly inapplicable to this part.
4 6
The Uniform Guidelines, in other words, have three strikes against them
under the enacted bill. They never had the force of substantive rules to begin
with and they failed to attain the status of substantive rules in the legislation; the
guidelines are irrelevant to the ADA language in any event, whatever their status
as a matter of administrative law. Furthermore, the EEOC rejected any
requirement to link particular cutoff scores to actual job performance, which was
the underlying point of the proponents' attempt to codify the guidelines.
. The legislative history does not provide any comparably detailed guidance
as to the meaning of the language taken from the ADA. It states, as noted
above, that the language means what the Supreme Court said business necessity
meant in cases prior to Wards Cove. As Carvin has pointed out, the Wards Cove
majority did not see itself as breaking any new ground on the question of job
performance (as distinguished from the burden of proof issue, or the causation
question, discussed below). And, as noted above, even the dissent's question
about "essentiality" or "indispensability" did not evince any concern about the
separate issue of job performance and the Uniform Guidelines, which was at the
heart of the debate.
Concededly, the bill's and the legislative history's silence with respect to the
Wards Cove decision does not prohibit the Court from writing a different opinion
43. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
44. Committee Report, supra note 8. at 44.
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app. (1993) (emphasis added).
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if faced with Wards Cove's precise facts again, but the EEOC regulations would
seem clearly to prohibit deference to the Uniform Guidelines, or erection of any
other standard that would permit easy challenges to an employer's business
judgment. This, in turn, would seem clearly to permit employers to use the kind
of ability and academic achievement tests originally permitted by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, but inhibited by the Uniform Guidelines and prohibited outright by
the initial bill's prohibition of the use of cutoff scores (unless statistically
validated). As so interpreted, therefore, the compromise language of the final
bill provided a significant relaxation, not a tightening, of the business necessity
definition for purposes of disparate impact cases.
B. Causation
Although not as prominent in the public debate, the causation issue was
nevertheless the occasion for hundreds of hours of negotiation. In many ways,
this issue, as presented in the bill vetoed by President Bush, posed an even
greater threat of quotas than codification of the Uniform Guidelines.
Section 4 of the vetoed bill provided that if a plaintiff "demonstrates that a
group of employment practices results in a disparate impact," he.will not be
required to show which particular practice in the group caused the disparity in
order to require the employer to defend every practice in the whole group.
4 7
What this meant was that mere allegation of a numerical imbalance alone was
enough to force an employer either to balance his numbers or to have an
expensive validation study proving that each step in his hiring program produced
clearly better-performing workers than any conceivable alternative-an obviously
difficult, if not impossible, burden. Rather than try to conduct the study and
defend the lawsuit, most employers would simply "hire by the numbers." This,
of course, is what the activists' and plaintiffs' lawyers wanted.
As with the business necessity issue, it is not at all clear that the Wards
Cove decision necessitated this bold quota-inducing language. In Wards Cove,
the plaintiffs did try to shift the burden of defense to the employer on a mere
showing of bad numbers alone, but the majority said no, the plaintiffs must
provide a "demonstration that specific elements of the petitioners' hiring process
have a significantly disparate impact on nonwhites. 4 8 To hold otherwise, the
majority said, would result in employers being potentially liable for "the myriad
of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of
their work forces. 49
The dissent takes issue with this, noting first, however, that "[i]t is
elementary that a plaintiff cannot recover upon proof of injury alone; rather, the
47. See. e.g.. 136 Cong. Rec. 499. 86 (daily ed. Oct. 17. 1990).
48. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642. 658, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125 (1989).
49. Id. at 657 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 US. 977, 992, 108 S. Ct. 2777,
2787 (1988)).
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plaintiff must connect the injury to an act of the defendant in order to establish
prima facie that the defendant is liable." This observation seems wholly in
accord with the majority. What then is the disagreement? "Although the causal
link must have substance, the act need not constitute the sole or primary cause
of the harm. Thus ... proof of numerous questionable employment practices
ought to fortify an employee's assertion that the practices caused racial
disparities."'" This last statement is difficult to evaluate fully, because it
assumes that the plaintiff has, first, at least alleged something questionable about
one or more practices, and thus identified them as suspect, and second, made
some minimal showing of a causative link to the disparity, which link would be
"fortif[ied]" by proof of the questionable practices.
In other words, the dissent says nothing to suggest that they would dispense
entirely with the requirement that the plaintiff identify a particular questionable
practice and provide some showing of a causative link. And, in fact, there is no
discussion in the committee report about how maintaining such a requirement in
some form changed the law. The report, for example, cites no cases allegedly
overruled by the majority opinion, and the dissent similarly cites no cases. Yet,
dispensing with this causation requirement is precisely what the vetoed bill
would have accomplished, even though there was nothing in Wards Cove calling
for such a dramatic change.
The Bush administration objected strenuously and, ultimately, successfully.
Thus, the enacted bill provides that a plaintiff must "demonstrate that each
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact"; except if
the elements of an employer's hiring process "are not capable of separation for
analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment
practice." The legislative history explains this merely by saying:
When a decision-making process includes particular, functionally-
integrated practices which are components of the same criterion,
standard, method of administration, or test, such as the height and
weight requirements designed to measure strength in Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the particular. functionally-integrated
practices may be analyzed as one employment practice. -
The provision ultimately adopted, together with its brief explanation, distills an
extraordinarily contentious and drawn-out negotiation over the causation issue.
The negotiation was highly hypothetical and abstract in nature, since there were
no reported cases that would have been decided differently depending on one's
preference for the majority or dissenting discussion of the causation issue.
50. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 672, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens, J.. dissenting)
(emphasis added).
51. Id. at 672-73, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 (Stevens. J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
52. 137 Cong. Rec. S15.276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
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There was one relevant case that surfaced early in the negotiations-Sledge
v. J.P. Stevens & Co. 5"-but in the end it was never cited by the legislation's
proponents, for reasons that will become clear in reviewing that case. The bill's
proponents argued that, under Wards Cove, plaintiffs would frequently be thrown
out of court when confronted with an employer who hired by the seat-of-the-
pants, that is, by purely subjective evaluation without any objective sorting out
on the basis of test results, high school grades, etc. The administration argued
that in such a case the subjective evaluation was itself the hiring practice, which
could be challenged and defended as such. No, said the civil rights proponents,
that happened recently in the Sledge case and the plaintiffs were thrown out of
court. A quick review of that case, however, shows that the judge threw out the
defendant, not the plaintiff, for being unable to explain what he had done. The
evidence consisted of an affidavit from a personnel officer to the effect that the
defendant's personnel officials had "no idea" of the bases on which they made
their employment decisions; the court ruled that "the identification by plaintiffs
of the uncontrolled, subjective discretion of defendant's employing officials as
the source of the discrimination shown by plaintiffs' statistics sufficed to satisfy
the causation requirements of Wards Cove."54
Thus came the recognition, embodied in the exception clause of the final
bill, that if one could not separate out the elements of a decision for analysis,
then the whole decision could be treated as a single hiring practice. But this
allowed the administration to insist that where one could identify the factors
relied on by the defendant, causation must be proved as to each of the factors.
The final bill, unlike the vetoed legislation, contained no language suggesting that
a plaintiff could make out a case simply by alleging a numerical imbalance. Lest
anyone try to confuse this already difficult issue by resorting to legislative
history, the parties agreed to limit the entire legislative history to two paragraphs,
the relevant one of which is quoted above.
As soon as agreement had been reached, however, Senator Kennedy went
out on the floor to provide legislative history that was totally inconsistent with
that agreement. Among other things, Senator Kennedy repeatedly said the
purpose of the legislation was to overrule Wards Cove, when in reality hundreds
of hours had been devoted to crafting a compromise bill and legislative history
that quite clearly avoided saying that Wards Cove was overruled.55 That was
extraordinary enough in the circumstances, but his lengthy discussion of
causation was even more bizarre.
In that regard, Senator Kennedy said the language of the compromise would
permit a plaintiff to challenge the use of a test, an interview, and a grade-point
average as a single hiring practice if the employer "subjectively reviews these
53. No. CIV. 1201, 1989 WL 168011 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 1989).
54. Id. at *4.
55. 137 Cong. Rec. S15,233 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
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three factors without assigning any particular weight to any of the factors." 6
But this hypothetical example did not constitute the "incapable-of-analysis"
example excepted in the bill, because the three components-test, interview, and
grades-were identified clearly and thus were obviously capable of separation
for analysis. Requiring a plaintiff to try to pin down the employer to some
rough approximation of his weighing of these factors does not render the
plaintiff's burden impossible. Conversely, not requiring the plaintiff to identify
the likely culprit or culprits among the selection criteria would mean that simply
alleging a numerical imbalance would be enough in this situation to win the
lawsuit. Concededly, under the compromise, the plaintiff may have to do some
work in the discovery process. But, given that there can always be a number of
factors that lead to a numerical imbalance but that have nothing to do with a
defendant's hiring practices, it is still important to require the plaintiff to identify
what causes an imbalance, lest the mere fact of a numerical imbalance dictate the
result in every case.
Even worse, Senator Kennedy misquoted the agreed-upon legislative history
to permit a plaintiff to attack an entire decisionmaking process by simply
alleging a numerical imbalance whenever that process includes particular,
functionally-integrated components of the same standard or test, regardless of
whether other aspects of the hiring process were capable of individual analy-
sis.57 The agreed-upon language by contrast stated only that the particular,
functionally-integrated practices may be analyzed as one employment practice,
not that the entire decisionmaking process could be treated as a single practice.
As a result of this breach of the agreement, the negotiators went back to the
drawing board. For awhile, it looked as though there might not be any bill at all.
Then, after the weekend, the Senate agreed to insert the original two-paragraph,
exclusive legislative-history floor statement into the bill itself, thus for the first
time writing a bill that by its own terms had no legislative history save what was
cited in the bill.
Ill. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Bush administration succeeded in blocking any specific change
in the law to legislate the Uniform Guidelines and to allow a plaintiff to win
merely by alleging a numerical imbalance. Moreover, the administration not
only gained a specific ban on race-norming, but also forced the adoption of a
provision that requires deference to business judgment on hiring qualifications
and that permits the use of ability and achievement tests in order to reestablish
the links between education and the workplace.
On balance, this has to be judged not simply as a defeat of the legislative
effort by the civil rights interest groups, but also as an unqualified victory by the
56. Id. at S15,234.
57. Id.
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Bush administration in its efforts to reward educational achievement. For, as
Coleman and Jordan recognized in their Washington Post article, the viability of
educational requirements was at the heart of the debate. In this regard, it seems
quite clear that, at the end of the day, employers should now be free to use tests
and other measures of educational achievement, as clearly envisioned by the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Educational achievement is clearly job related, and no
employer will be required, every time he hires a new employee, to have a
validation study to establish for that particular employee the central importance
of education to our nation's job future.
The need to end the divorce between the high school and the workplace
continues to grow in importance. The New York Times reported on February 20,
1994, that Secretary of Education Riley and Secretary of Labor Reich had hosted
a conference in California to urge stronger "programs for students not bound for
college, particularly school-to-work transition programs. '58 The article noted
that the Clinton Administration's Goals 2000 education legislation "emphasizes
job training for high school students." 9 According to another Times article,
published a few days later, the core of President Clinton's education policy,
indeed, seems to be the "need for new links between learning and jobs... . "We
have to tie the workplace to the learning environment in high school," the
President himself was quoted as saying.6' The article went on to note that one
of the hurdles to stronger workplace programs was "a communications gap
between educators and businessmen."6' One school official was then quoted
as saying, "At one time, businesses told us they wanted people who would show
up on time, treat our customers well and take coaching. Now they are
demanding more, but so are we. '"63
The point is, thanks in part to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, employers are
now legally entitled to ask for more in terms of student performance in school.
There is evidence they are now doing so. The Wall Street Journal's lead story
for March 11, 1994, headlined "Auto Plants, Hiring Again, Are Demanding
Higher-Skilled Labor," surveys the auto industry's new and heavy reliance on
ability testing and education and achievement. "Prospective workers are being
tested in everything from mathematics to manual dexterity," the article said,
noting that among the new Ford workers, "about a third have attended college,
4 percent have four-year degrees [and] 97 percent have high-school diplomas."
The story also noted that the Canadian Auto Workers union says the "preferen ce
for high-school graduates in [Canada] is discriminatory," but identified no civil
rights law barriers to the new hiring practices.
58. William Cells III, Tying Education to the Economy, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20. 1994 at Al 1.
59. Id.
60. Catherine S. Manegold. Clinton Tells Educators Youths Are Not Getting Practical Skills for
Jobs, N.Y. Times. Feb. 23, 1994, at Bl2.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Postscript: Media Left and Right
A few words about press coverage of the legislation and its relationship to
the interest groups involved might be appropriate here. Press cover-
age-especially by the print media--of an issue of this magnitude is important
because published accounts of what the bill does are for many small businesses
the only source of information about their legal obligations. It does not do much
good to enact a bill that allows businesses to demand more of their high schools
if they are not informed of that fact or, even worse, are told the contrary is true.
And, needless to say, it does not do much good to enact a bill that says one thing
if the regulators interpret it to say the opposite (as they did with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act) and the press allows them to get by with it.
The media coverage of the civil rights fight was surprisingly nonsubstantive
throughout the battle, especially in light of the long time the issue maintained its
front-page interest and, thus, the long time for reporters to educate themselves.
A few reporters did, in fact, provide insight into what might have been
motivating the various players; Steven Holmes of the New York Times and
syndicated columnist Ben Wattenberg come conspicuously to mind. But by and
large, the reporters involved reported the usual horse-race material on "who won,
who lost," and failed to address the central policy issue under debate-namely,
the impact of the bill on education and education reform. Intensifying the
perplexity (for this writer in any event) at why the press ignored the education
issue is the fact that the two most important of all the Supreme Court decisions
on race in the last half century-Brown v. Board of Education64 and Griggs,
which was, after all, the focus of the fight-both involved education as the
central issue.
The most obvious explanation is that once the interest groups committed
themselves to the proposed legislation, the media went along in support, being,
as it is, philosophically more sympathetic to both the interest groups and the
Democratic Congress than it was to the Bush administration. Thus, the
mainstream media has no real interest in taking on, for instance, the National
Education Association. In addition to being a major force in the NAACP-and
a powerful force in the AFL-CIO, which in turn is a major financial backer of
the NAACP-the NEA is, along with the NAACP, one of the foundation blocks
of the Democratic Party. And the NEA has every interest in frustrating
educational reforrn and thus a strong interest in preventing employers from
playing a greater role in disciplining the public school system.
One of the most interesting aspects of the media coverage, however, was the
avoidance of the educational issues by even the conservative press. Although
Patrick Buchanan tried to make an issue during the primaries of President Bush's
alleged signing of a "quota bill," neither he nor any other conservative
commentator spent any time during the fight discussing the civil rights bill
64. 347 U.S. 483. 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
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generally, let alone the quota and educational issues specifically. These
conservative commentators were, however, just as quick as the mainstream media
to claim President Bush had caved in, once the bill was signed into law.
Conservative commentators still take this view in the popular press. 65  This is
not just frustrating but ultimately pernicious, because it will not matter that the
bill in fact permits employers to rely on educational achievement (and thus to
risk an imbalanced work force) if they read the contrary in the public press.
Accordingly, it becomes important to understand why not only the left but also
the right constantly get it wrong.
The only suggestion that makes sense is that those conservatives who did not
like President Bush found it in their interest to look for a way to criticize him
after the bill's enactment, just as they found it in their interest to avoid
applauding him when he successfully sustained the veto, against all odds, of the
original legislation. These commentators, in other words, wanted to have quotas
as a "wedge" issue for political purposes, just as the liberal commentators wanted
quotas in fact even though neither could openly admit their real desire. Hence
the convergence of interests. President Bush confounded both sides, however,
and thus irritated both sides equally.
Taking quotas off the table was good policy, of course, but not good short-
term politics. Quotas were an effective wedge issue for Reagan Democrats, and
losing that issue probably meant losing some of them. Some conservative
commentators were thus arguably right to see the bill signing as a political
mistake. But if that is so, then some of those same commentators ought to
balance the accounts by giving President Bush credit for trading the political
issue in exchange for the policy victory of deregulating the restrictions on
"incentivizing" educational achievement. They should acknowledge this, not as
a Bush victory per se, but as a win for education deregulation, so that the
business community can be adequately informed to get about the job of helping
reform the public schools through their recruiting, hiring, and training programs.
Otherwise many businesses will ask the high schools for much less in terms of
performance and achievement than they are in reality entitled to.
Adequately explaining the deregulatory aspects of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
would also close a chapter that has remained open on the Clarence Thomas
confirmation fight. Does it really make sense that Congress would confirm an
anti-quota Justice to the Supreme Court, and then within just weeks enact pro-
quota legislation-overturning the Supreme Court's anti-quota decision? No, the
Congress and the public, which Congress is supposed to represent, are not that
fickle and inconsistent. The confirmation and the compromise bill were
consistent in their rejection of quotas and their embrace of education. This
double congressional rejection of quotas-never popular-may explain why
65. See, e.g., Frederick R. Lynch, WorkJorce Div'ersity: PC's Final Frontier?, Nat'l Rev., Feb.
21, 1994, at 32.
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Justice Thomas was no more an issue in the presidential race than the civil rights
bill itself.
Moreover, if it would be helpful to recognize more precisely what the 1991
bill does and does not do, it would be equally helpful to understand more fully
the victory Justice Thomas also won against the AFL-CIO and the NAACP in
the name of true educational opportunity for all disadvantaged. After all, quite
aside from his views on quotas, Justice Thomas represents the ultimate triumph
of school choice and the importance of educational quality in breaking the grip
of abject poverty and hurdling existing cultural and social barriers to success.

